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Abstract
A digital security breach, by which confidential information is leaked, does not only
affect the agent whose system is infiltrated, but is also detrimental to other agents
socially connected to the infiltrated system. Although it has been argued that these
externalities create incentives to under-invest in security, this presumption is challenged
by the possibility of strategic adversaries that attack the least protected agents. In this
paper we study a new model of security games in which agents share tokens of sensitive
information in a network of contacts. The agents have the opportunity to invest in secu-
rity to protect against an attack that can be either strategically or randomly targeted.
We show that, in the presence of random attack, under-investments always prevail at
the Nash equilibrium in comparison with the social optimum. Instead, when the attack
is strategic, either under-investments or over-investments are possible, depending on the
network topology and on the characteristics of the process of the spreading of informa-
tion. Actually, agents invest more in security than socially optimal when dependencies
among agents are low (which can happen because the information network is sparsely
connected or because the probability that information tokens are shared is small). These
over-investments pass on to under-investments when information sharing is more likely
(and therefore, when the risk brought by the attack is higher).
1 Introduction
Our society and economy have become largely dependent on sharing information over net-
works. Although in general computer networks provide benefits, they are also prone to cyber
attacks, whose impact increases with our dependence on them. Security breaches can have
various origins, such as the spread of malware, compromissions of social network accounts, or
exploitations of system vulnerabilities. In this paper, we interested in cyber attacks where,
without permission, confidential information is obtained. This information may represent for
instance confidential documents, intellectual property or identity information. The impact
of having sensitive information stolen can be destructive: bank accounts can be plundered,
companies can be threatened that strategic decisions or sensitive information will be released
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or identities can be stolen for criminal purposes. These forms of cyber attacks where confi-
dential information is obtained are occurring more often and keeping personal information
out of the hands of thieves is becoming increasingly difficult [15].
From both the scientific literature and the general media [23], it is apparent that the
variety of potential threats is huge. Depending on their purpose, some attacks aim at com-
promising a whole class of systems or devices, whereas others aim at precise targets. We
shall refer to the former type of attacks as random attacks and to the latter type as strate-
gic attacks [1, 20]. An example of a random cyber attack would be WannaCry. This is a
ransomware virus that in 2017 infected about 200,000 computers worldwide, including com-
puters of the National Health Service in the UK, Renault in France and Telefonica in Spain:
these computers were all vulnerable because their operators failed to install in time a simple
software patch - i.e. arguably under-invested in security measures. Examples of strategic
cyber attacks are quite common. A well-known attack is the 2016 security breach against the
Democratic National Committee, by which thousands of e-mails were stolen and subsequently
leaked, including e-mails from Hillary Clinton.
Researchers have soon recognized that network security is not only a matter of devising
suitable security measures, but also of making sure that individuals put them into prac-
tice [23]. Consequently, the adoption of security measures has been regarded as an economic
problem and has been addressed with the tools of game theory. In this perspective, the key
observation is that the presence of a network introduces interdependencies between risks and
costs incurred by the individuals [14]. Hence, the interesting question becomes understanding
the effects of these interdependencies. In order to answer this question, a large literature has
been developed not only in the economic science but also in computer science [20] and in
engineering, including security problems for wireless communication [19] and interdependent
control systems by [2, 25, 24, 12]. These works have addressed an array of questions that are
relevant in our own work, including security games featuring strategic attacks [7], multiple
targets [20], multiple attackers and defenders [26]. In this Introduction, we will not trying to
provide a complete literature survey on interdependent security, for which we can point the
reader to sources like [3, 21, 17, 13]. Instead, we will more modestly highlight a few recurring
issues that motivate our work on interdependencies in network security.
A number of papers [3, 18] have argued that security investments are not as high as
they should be due to externalities in the network. These externalities originate because
confidential information can be leaked through other channels than one’s own device. As
a consequence, agents face risks whose magnitude depend not only on their own security
levels but also on the security levels of others. In this setting, investments act like strategic
complements as benefits of security adoption are not exclusively for the one that invested
in the security. Consequently, a negligent agent who does not adequately protect his and
others’ information due to free-riding, may cause considerable damage to other agents in the
network. This leads to situations where benefits of security adoption might fall significantly
below the cost of adoption, which causes under-investments.
More recently, the prediction of under-investments in information networks has been
challenged. Acemoglu et al. [1] and Bachrach et al. [4] show that investments in security
might as well be strategic substitutes when agents face an intelligent threat. In their setting,
an attacker can aim at the weakest nodes: in this case, a negligent agent who does not invest
in security has a relative higher chance that his information is stolen by a direct attack of the
hacker. This eliminates the ability to free-ride on security investments of others and forces an
agent to invest. In fact, this framework leads to incentives which correspond to an arms race:
agents compete with each other leading to over-investments in security. Bachrach et al. even
propose that an optimal policy requires taxing security, contrarily to subsidizing security as
recommended by models that do not include an intelligent adversary.
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Our work provides a tractable model of network security game that can explain both
under-investments and over-investments, depending on the strategy of attack and on the
amount of shared information, which eventually depends on the topology of the network
connecting the agents. Our original framework and our results can be informally described
as follows. Inspired by attacks that aim at recovering sensitive information, such as the
DNC hack, we define a dissemination model where interconnected agents share confidential
information (e-mails) with each other with a certain probability p, resulting in a dissemination
of information among peers that depends on the network structure. Agents store information
(both their own and that received from others) and invest in security to protect it. A
malignant and possibly intelligent attacker, who has the goal to obtain as much information
as possible, attacks one of the agents. If the attack is successful, the attacker acquires all
the information that was stored by the agent, thus making this agent and possibly also other
agents, which have entrusted their information to the attacked agent, victims of the attack.
If the attacker is able to optimally choose which agent to attack, the attack will be said to be
strategic: otherwise, to be random. In our model, the security investments are the outcome
of the resulting two-stage game between the agents and the attacker, where the attacker
knows the investments of the agents, who in turn choose their investments anticipating the
strategy of the attacker. Under this game structure, we show that when the attack is random,
then the equilibrium investments are lower than the socially optimal investments. Instead,
if the attack is strategic, then the relation between optimal and equilibrium investments
depends on the amount of information shared: when the fraction of shared information is
low, equilibrium investments are higher than optimal ones, whereas the opposite happens
when the fraction of shared information is high. The fraction of shared information can
be high for two distinct reasons: either the diffusion probability p is high, or the network is
tightly connected. The latter case shows our results to be consistent with those in [7], where
the authors adapt interdependent security games to model strategic attacks and find that
over-investments prevail in nondense networks.
In order to keep our analysis tractable, some of our results on strategic attacks make an
assumption of homogeneity in the network, namely that the network is vertex-transitive. We
complement these results with an analysis of the security game on star graphs, which we
choose as a natural example of non-homogeneous topology: this case study shows that the
essential lines of our findings, as we described them above, remain valid on general graphs.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the problem that we want to
address, introducing the dissemination model, the attack and the security investments. Sub-
sequently, Section 3 examines the dissemination model that underlies the security game.
Sections 4 and 5 are the core of our paper, as they study the security game when the attack
is random and when the attack is strategic, respectively. Finally, Section 6 discusses the ob-
tained results and complements them with numerical evaluations on complete, ring, and star
graphs that we have selected as fundamental examples. Section 7 summarizes and concludes
the paper. The body of the paper is complemented by an Appendix which is devoted to
detailed derivations (for the examples of complete and star graphs) and proofs (of the main
results about strategic attacks).
2 Information dissemination and network game
Our dynamics of interest take place on a network of agents that can share tokens of infor-
mation, such as confidential documents, with each other. Let us think of n agents in a set
V = {1, . . . , n}. We say that two agents i and j are linked by an edge (i, j) when i and j
can share documents directly with each other. These edges create a (undirected) network
G = 〈V,A〉, where A : V × V → {0, 1} is the adjacency matrix in which A(i, j) = A(j, i) = 1
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Figure 1: The leftmost network is a complete network and the middle one is a ring network.
In the ring, {(0, 1)(1, 2)(2, 3)} is a possible path from agent 0 to agent 3. As each edge in the
ring is also in the complete network, the ring is a subnetwork of the complete network. While
the rightmost network is not connected, it is a subnetwork of the ring and of the complete
network.
if and only if i and j are linked by an edge. We denote the set of all edges in G as E(G). In
this graph theoretical context, we need to recall some standard definitions. A path u in G be-
tween agent i and j is a sequence of distinct edges u = {(i, κ1), (κ1, κ2), . . . , (κ`−1, κ`), (κ`, j)},
where |u| = ` is the length of the path. We assume that G is a network in which there exists
a path between all pairs of agents, in other words, G is a connected network. A subnetwork
G′ = (V ′, A′) of G is a network such that V ′ ⊂ V and E(G′) ⊂ E(G). In Figure 1 we illustrate
these concepts and show some networks of interest.
Our problem statement requires us to specify three key ingredients: (i) the dissemination
of information, (ii) the adversary attack, (iii) the defensive investments.
Information dissemination model. We assume that initially every agent owns a unique
document which we will denote as di for agent i. All the n documents spread, independently of
each other, over the network G. Although the documents are confidential, it is not detrimental
for an agent when his document is obtained by other agents. We assume that an agent obtains
a document from another agent with probability p when they are connected. This leads to
a so-called transmission network for each document. A generic transmission network T is a
random subnetwork of G and formally defined as 〈V, A˜〉, where
A˜(i, j) = A˜(j, i) = Xij A(i, j)
where Xij are independent random variables identically distributed according to a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter p. We are thus assuming that the probability of transmission
between two neighboring nodes is identical for every document. Let T` and xij,` be instances
of transmission networks and transmission probabilities for a dissemination starting from any
` ∈ V . Then T` = 〈V, A˜`〉 with A˜`(i, j) = A˜`(j, i) = Xij,` A(i, j). Now, an agent obtains
document d` when she is connected to agent ` in the transmission network T`. The spread
of the n documents then is described by the n transmission networks.
The network structure determines the probability that a document spreads from its owner
to another agent. We define the matrix P with elements Pij representing the probability that
agent j owns document di after dissemination
Pij = Pr{there exists a path between i and j in Ti} (1)
= Pr{
⋃
u∈Ui,j(G)
{u ∈ Ui,j(Ti)}}, (2)
where Ui,j(G) is the set of all paths between agent i and j in network G. Note that the matrix
P is symmetric and only depends on G and on p. Since we assumed that G is connected, P
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contains only strictly positive elements. Although Pij = Pji, the event that j obtains di is
independent of i obtaining dj , because they are respectively taking place on the transmission
networks Ti and Tj . Denote the expected number of documents obtained by agent i as Di
and note that
Di =
∑
j∈V
Pji =
∑
j 6=i
Pji + 1. (3)
We additionally denote D = {D1, . . . , Dn}.
Attack model. After the documents have spread through the network, the adversary
attacks one agent. We model this attack by a random variable from a distribution over
the agents. This distribution is conveniently represented by the probability vector a =
{a1, . . . , an} which we call the attack vector. When an attack on an agent is successful the
attacker will steal all the documents stored at the target. This always includes an agent’s
own document, but may additionally include documents of other agents. We assume that
the attack vector is established before the documents spread through the network.
Defense model. Before the attack vector is chosen, agents have the opportunity to pre-
cautionary invest in security. We denote these investments q = {q1, . . . , qn} as the security
vector. These security investments are such that an attack on agent i is successful with prob-
ability 1− qi. Let xi = 1 denote the event that the attacker obtains document di, and xi = 0
otherwise. Consequently, by conditioning and exploiting independence we establish that
Pr{xi = 1} =
∑
j∈V
aj(1− qj)Pij . (4)
Recognize that the security of an agent i, that is, the privacy of his information di, does not
only depend on his own investment, but also depends on the investments by the other agents.
Furthermore, let |x| = ∑i∈V xi. Observe that the expected number of stolen documents is
E(|x|) =
∑
i∈V
Pr{xi = 1}
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aj(1− qj)Pij
=
∑
j∈V
aj(1− qj)Dj , (5)
because the attacker affects only one node directly.
Problem summary. The timing in our problem is as follows. Firstly, the agents invest in
security by selecting the security vector q. Secondly, the attacker chooses the attack vector
a, possibly in order to maximize his reward. Hereafter, the documents spread through the
network. Finally, one agent is attacked by the attacker. Since in our model the attacker
observes the security levels of all the agents, the relevant equilibrium concept is that of the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the resulting two-stage game [22]: the agents first select their
security levels anticipating the decision of the attacker (as they know his strategy) and the
attacker optimizes his attack strategy while having knowledge of the security choices. Let us
note that the proposed sequence of players actions in the Stackelberg game (first defender,
then attacker) is the interesting one to study. On the contrary, the reverse sequence would
be unrealistic and would trivialize the game. Should the attacker go first, then the agents
would just know who is to be attacked and would simply be able to optimally protect the
target node.
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More on the relation with literature on contagion and security games. The two-
stage scheme of the strategic security game that we study in this paper is adopted from the
work [1] on cascading failures and contagion. However, our problem statement is different be-
cause the underlying diffusion/contagion model is different. In [1], each agents is susceptible
to the attack with probability 1− qi and the infection spreads from the attacked node to all
nodes that are connected to it in the sub-network spanned by the susceptible nodes. There-
fore, an investment in security prevents both contagion from a direct attack and contagion
through the network. Instead, in our model the susceptibility is only realized at the attacked
node, whereas the dissemination of information independently takes place across all edges for
all pieces of information. Therefore, nodes cannot be safe from damage even if they invest
maximally in security, since their private information is shared with other nodes. Another
difference is the explicit presence of the variable p, the probability of diffusion: in our results
the amount of over- or under-investments is dependent on the level of interdependence in the
network, which is directly influenced by the network topology and by the probability p.
3 Information dissemination
The next proposition provides more insight about the value of Di, the expected number of
documents obtained by agent i. Its proof is straightforward and therefore omitted. In order
to emphasize the dependence of Di on p and G, we shall use the notation Di(p,G). The result
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 1 (Monotonicities). Given a network G, Di(p,G) is strictly increasing in p
for all i. Given two networks H ⊂ G, Di(p,H) ≤ Di(p,G), provided node i belongs to both
networks.
Example 1 (Star graph). Consider a star graph with n nodes: node 1 is the center and the
remaining n− 1 nodes are the leaves. Note that (with i, j > 1 and i 6= j)
P1i = p Pi1 = p Pij = p
2.
Hence,
D1 = (n− 1)p+ 1 Di = (n− 2)p2 + 1 + p,
which implies that D1 > Di.
In order to make our analysis tractable, we will often assume the networks to be vertex-
transitive. Although this choice limits the scope of our results, we conjecture that economic
forces in vertex-transitive networks extend to a broader class of networks. Informally, a
vertex-transitive network is a network which ‘looks the same’ at every node. More precisely,
we adopt the following definition.
Definition 1 (Vertex transitivity). A network G is vertex-transitive if and only if for any
two nodes i and j there exists a mapping φ such that φ(i) = j while the structure of G is
preserved: A(κ1, κ2) = A(φ(κ1), φ(κ2)) for all κ1, κ2 ∈ V .
The two leftmost networks in figure 2 are examples of vertex-transitive networks. While
every agent in a vertex-transitive network has the same number of other agents whom she
is linked to (regular network), the converse is not necessarily true. As an example, the last
network in figure 2 is regular but not vertex-transitive. It is no surprise that every agent in a
vertex-transitive networks obtains — in expectation — the same number of documents. We
state this formally in the next proposition.
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Figure 2: Several 3-regular networks. The complete network with 4 agents and the middle
network are vertex-transitive networks. The last network is an example of a network which
is regular but not vertex-transitive.
Proposition 2 (Shared documents in vertex-transitive networks). In any vertex-transitive
network, Di = Dj for all i, j ∈ V .
Proof. By vertex-transitivity there exists a φ such that φ(i) = j while the structure is
preserved, which means that P`k = Pφ(`)φ(k). Consequently by (3), Di =
∑
k∈V Pk,i =∑
φ(k)∈V Pφ(k),j = Dj , yielding the result.
Since on vertex-transitive networks all elements in D are identical (for all values of p),
we will adopt the notation Di = D. Complete graphs and ring graphs are both examples of
vertex-transitive networks.
Example 2 (Ring graph). Consider a ring graph with n nodes (see Figure 1). Let dist(i, j) =
min{|i− j|, n−|i− j|} be the distance between nodes i and j. By a simple inclusion-exclusion
reasoning, observe that if j 6= i then
Pij = p
dist(i,j) + pn−dist(i,j) − pn.
Hence, by summing over the nodes
D = 1 + 2
n−1∑
`=1
p` − (n− 1)pn = 1 + p− p
n(n+ 1) + pn+1(n− 1)
1− p .
Note that D → 1+p1−p as n → ∞. In contrast, recall from Example 1 that Di is unbounded in
n on star graphs.
Ring and star graphs are simple to deal with because the number of possible paths between
two nodes is small. On the contrary, the complete graph has a very large number of possible
connecting paths. Nevertheless, some quantities can be explicitly computed.
Example 3 (Complete graph). For the sake of clarity, we denote by Dn and Pnij the expected
number of documents and the generic transmission probability on the complete graph Kn,
respectively. Due to transitivity,
Dn = 1 + (n− 1)Pnij
and for small n we easily see that P 2ij = p and P
3
ij = p+p
2−p3. To obtain some more general
expressions, let Qn denote the probability that any document reaches all nodes in Kn. Then,
Q1 = 1 and
Qk = 1−
k−1∑
`=1
(
k − 1
`− 1
)
(1− p)`(k−`)Q`. (6)
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Figure 3: Computations on ring and complete graphs illustrate that the expected number of
documents D obtained by each agent is increasing in the density of the network and in p.
Note that for any graph for which the ring is a subgraph, every Di must be higher than D
in the ring and lower than D in the complete graph.
In turn,
Pnij =
n∑
k=2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
(1− p)k(n−k)Qk. (7)
These formulas, proved in the Appendix, allow for the numerical evaluation of D on graphs
of moderate size, as shown in Figure 3. For large n, it is useful to consider the bounds
1− (1− p)(1− p2)n−2 ≤ Pnij ≤ 1− (1− p)n−1.
The lower bound can be obtained by considering only propagation across paths of length at
most two. The upper bound can be obtained by considering that the document from i cannot
reach vertex j unless at least one edge reaches j in graph Ti. These two bounds together imply
that Di is asymptotically linear in n.
4 Security under random attacks
Security investments are conveniently modeled as the outcome of a game between agents. In
this section, we look at the social optimum and the equilibria of this security game in the
presence of a random attack. The game with a strategic attack is considered in Section 5.
The security game with random attacks is defined as follows. A random attack is defined
by the uniform attack vector
ai =
1
n
∀i,
which is known to all agents.The player set is the set of agents or nodes V . The strategy set
of agent i is Qi = [0, 1]. The reward of each agent i is defined as the probability that her
own document is safe minus the incurred cost, that is,
Πi = 1− Pr{xi = 1} − c(qi), (8)
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where Pr{xi = 1} is given in (4) and c(qi) is the cost agent i incurs for choosing qi. We
assume that
c(q) =
1
2
αq2
for some α ≥ 1. The choice of a quadratic cost is made for simplicity: the analysis can be
extended to other smooth convex increasing functions. The choice of α, instead, is meant to
make the cost “large”, so to rule out trivial game outcomes with maximal investments. Also
this assumption can be relaxed at the price of more involved analysis.
In this setting each agent attempts to maximize his/her reward while disregarding the
utilities of the others. This is described by a noncooperative game (V, {Qi}i∈V , {Πi}i∈V ) with
player set V . Any player i ∈ V has strategy set Qi and payoff function Πi. For these games,
the classical definition of Nash equilibrium is of interest: an investment level qN is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium if for any player i and any investment level qi ∈ [0, 1] unilateral
deviation does not pay,
Πi({qNi ,qN−i}) ≥ Πi({qi,qN−i}).
Here ({qi,qN−i}) denotes the vector qN where component i is replaced by qi. In security
games under random attack, the Nash equilibrium has a simple structure.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium against random attack). In a security game facing a random
attack, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium qN,R is unique and is equal to
qN,Ri =
1
αn
∀i. (9)
Proof. The utility of agent i reads Πi = 1 − 1n
∑
j(1 − qj)Pij − 12αq2i . We easily see that
∂Πi
∂qi
= 1n − αqi and ∂
2Πi
∂q2i
= −α < 0. Since ∂Πi∂qi (0,q−i) > 0 and ∂Πi∂qi (1,q−i) < 0, we
conclude that the largest utility is obtained with investment qN,Ri =
1
αn , the unique only
Nash equilibrium.
Some remarks are in order. Firstly, the Nash equilibrium does not depend on p or on the
network. The economic motivation for this result is intuitive. As an agent cannot control
a possible external loss in a random attack, an increase in investments does not lead to a
reduced risk that his document is stolen through another agent. This forces an agent —
in a non-cooperative setting — to ignore the external risk and to find the optimal trade-off
between investment costs and protection against a direct loss. Secondly, the investment levels
at the Nash equilibrium go to zero as the number of nodes goes to infinity. This is because
the risk of being attacked is diluted in large networks.
In contrast with the above non-cooperative setting, we may consider a cooperative setting
where all agents cooperate to maximize the social utility, which equals the sum of the agents’
utilities:
S(q) =
∑
i∈V
Πi = n− E(|x|)−
∑
i∈V
c(qi). (10)
By the continuity of S on its compact domain [0, 1]n, the function S must attain a maximum.
That maximum is said to be the social optimum.
Theorem 2 (Social optimum against random attack). In a network facing a random attack,
the social optimum qO,R is unique and is equal to
qO,Ri =
Di
αn
∀i. (11)
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Proof. By (5) the global utility reads S(q) = n − 1n
∑
j(1 − qj)Dj − α2
∑
j q
2
j . We easily see
that ∂S∂qi =
1
nDi − αqi and
∂2S
∂q2i
= −α < 0 ∂
2S
∂qi∂qj
= 0,
implying that S is a concave function of q. Since ∂S∂qi (0,q−i) > 0 and
∂S
∂qi
(1,q−i) < 0 because
Di ≤ n and α ≥ 1, we conclude that qO,R with qO,Ri = Diαn is the unique maximizer.
Comparing these results shows that the Nash equilibrium features under-investments
relative to the social optimum. This happens because in the cooperative setting an agent also
invests to protect documents of others. This additional effort leads to higher investments
in security, which depend on the network and the probability p. The following examples
illustrate these observations.
Example 4 (Ring network, cont’d). Consider the ring network studied in Example 2 and
assume α = 1. Then, the socially optimal investments are
qO,Ri =
1 + p− pn(n+ 1) + pn+1(n− 1)
(1− p)n i ∈ V,
and the Nash equilibrium investments remain qN,Ri = 1/n. Both these quantities decrease to
zero as n goes to infinity.
Example 5 (Star network, cont’d). Consider the star network studied in Example 1 and
assume α = 1. Then, the socially optimal investments are
qO,Ri =
{
(n−1)p+1
n i = 1
(n−2)p2+p+1
n i > 1
Observe that all investments are non-vanishing for n → ∞ and that the central node 1
supports the highest investment. On the contrary, the Nash equilibrium investments qN,Ri =
1/n go to zero for n→∞.
Example 6 (Complete network, cont’d). Consider the complete network studied in Exam-
ple 3 and assume α = 1. Then, the socially optimal investments converge (exponentially fast
in n) to the maximum investment:
qO,Ri → 1 as n→∞,
while the equilibrium investments go to zero for n→∞.
Optimal investments are larger on networks that are well connected. Indeed, they are
vanishing in the limit for large n for the cycle graph, which is poorly connected, whereas
investments are non-vanishing in the limit for large n on well-connected networks such as
stars and complete graphs. Consistently, the complete graph requires the highest security
investments.
5 Security under strategic attacks
In the previous section we analysed the security game in the presence of a random attack.
As of this section we allow for a strategic attack by the adversary. As such, the adversary
and agents are involved in a two-stage game, the so-called Stackelberg game [22]. In the first
stage, the agents determine their investments in security. Thereafter, in the second stage,
the adversary selects an attack strategy. Such a game is solved by a Stackelberg equilibrium.
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5.1 Definition of strategic attack
We start the analysis with the strategy of the attacker. The vector a is chosen by the
attacker in an optimal way, based on the knowledge of the network and of the vector q.
More precisely, we assume that the strategy of the attacker is an optimal trade-off between
the expected number of stolen documents and the cost of this attack, solving the following
optimization problem
max
a
E(|x|)−
∑
i∈V
ψ(ai) (12)
subject to |a| = 1 and ai ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V.
Here the expected number of stolen documents is E(|x|) and the function ψ : [0, 1] → R≥0
defines the cost the attacker incurs for choosing a. Note that this framework is consistent
with the attacker playing the Stackelberg game after the defending agents. In this paper we
assume quadratic costs
ψ(a) =
1
2
ωa2
with ω ≥ 1. Note that this definition implies that a more precise attack is more costly than
a more random one. Similarly to what was discussed for the agent’s cost c, extensions to
other convex increasing functions are possible. By using the expression for E(|x|) in (5), the
problem becomes
max
a
n∑
i=1
(
ai(1− qi)Di − 1
2
ωa2i
)
(13)
subject to |a| = 1 and ai ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions can be used to solve (13). As the objective
function is strictly concave, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to obtain the optimal
solution. The KKT conditions read
(1− qi)Di − ωai + λ+ κi = 0, ∀i, (14a)∑
i∈V
ai = 1, (14b)
ai ≥ 0, ∀i, (14c)
κi ≥ 0, ∀i, (14d)
κiai = 0, ∀i, (14e)
where λ ∈ R and κi ∈ R+ for all i are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the
constraints (14b) and (14c) respectively. Solving these conditions results in the following
characterization of the optimal attack strategy.
Proposition 3 (Optimal attack vector). The optimal attack vector a∗ chosen by the attacker,
solving (13), is given by the unique solution (λ∗,a∗) to the equations
ω =
∑
i∈V
max{0, (1− qi)Di + λ}, (15a)
ai =
1
ω
max{0, (1− qi)Di + λ} ∀i ∈ V. (15b)
Consequently, a∗ is a function of q and D (and in turn of p and of the topology of the
network).
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Proof. By substituting (14a) into (14b) and noting that by (14e) κi = 0 if ai > 0, the
multiplier λ∗ must solve
ω =
∑
i∈V
max{0, (1− qi)Di + λ}
To show that λ∗ is unique, suppose that there are two solutions of (15a): λ1 and λ2. Without
loss of generality, assume that λ1 < λ2 and set Vk = {i ∈ V | (1−qi)Di+λk > 0} for k = 1, 2.
Obviously, V1 ⊆ V2. Also note that
0 = ω − ω =
∑
i∈V1
(
(1− qi)Di + λ1
)−∑
i∈V2
(
(1− qi)Di + λ2
)
= −
∑
i∈V2\V1
(1− qi)Di + λ1|V1| − λ2|V2| < 0,
which gives us a contradiction. So, λ∗ is unique. Next, (14a) directly leads to (15b) and
ai(q) is a well-defined function of q by the uniqueness of λ
∗.
The example below illustrates the optimal strategic attack probabilities for star networks.
Example 7 (Star network, cont’d). Consider the star network studied in Example 1 and, by
symmetry, assume that q2 = . . . = qn. We begin by looking for solutions to (??) such that
a∗i > 0 for all i. In this case, equations (15a) and (15b) become
1 = ω = (1− q1)D1 + (n− 1)(1− q2)D2 + nλ∗,
a∗1 = ωa
∗
1 = (1− q1)D1 + λ∗,
a∗2 = ωa
∗
2 = (1− q2)D2 + λ∗,
and a∗k = a
∗
2 for k = 3, . . . , n. Solving the first equation for λ
∗ and substituting that in the
other two equations yields
a∗1 =
1
n
+
1
ω
(1− 1
n
) ((1− q1)D1 − (1− q2)D2) ,
a∗2 =
1
n
+
1
ω
1
n
((1− q2)D2 − (1− q1)D1) .
Let ∆ = (1 − q1)D1 − (1 − q2)D2 and observe that ∆ can be either negative or positive
and its magnitude is approximately linear in n. Since a∗1−a∗2 = 1ω∆, we observe that a∗1 > a∗2
when
1− q1
1− q2 >
D2
D1
.
Let us refer to 1 − qi as the “risk” taken by agent i. Since D2/D1 → p when n → ∞, we
may say that on large star networks, the center is more likely to be attacked than the leaves
when the center takes more than p times the risk taken by the leaves.
When n grows larger, the gap between the two attack probabilities increases, until a∗1 = 1
and a∗2 = 0 (if ∆ > 0) or until a
∗
1 = 0 and a
∗
2 =
1
n−1 (if ∆ < 0). The former vector is indeed
the optimal solution when ω ≤ ∆, whereas the latter is optimal when ω ≤ −(n− 1)∆.
Since finding explicit solutions to (15) quickly becomes unfeasible on more complex
graphs, we instead set to investigate qualitative properties of the optimal attack vector.
In the next result, we derive how the optimal attack probabilities depend on the invest-
ment levels q. The formulas confirm the intuition that the optimal attack probability a∗i is
decreasing in the investments qi of agent i, and increasing in the investments qj of agents
j 6= i.
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Proposition 4 (How attacks depend on investments). The marginal changes of the optimal
attack probability a∗i > 0 to qi and to qj for agent j with a
∗
j > 0, are respectively given by
∂a∗i
∂qi
= −n
∗ − 1
ωn∗
Di and
∂a∗i
∂qj
=
1
ωn∗
Dj (16)
where n∗ = |{i ∈ V : a∗i > 0}| is the number of agents with strict positive probability of being
attacked. In particular, a∗i is nonincreasing in qi and nondecreasing in qj.
Proof. The marginal changes follow from the KKT-conditions in (14). First note that κi = 0
when a∗i > 0. Consequently when we differentiate KKT-condition (14a) with respect to qi
we get
−Di − ω∂a
∗
i
∂qi
+
∂λ
∂qi
= 0
∂a∗i
∂qi
= −Di
ω
+
1
ω
∂λ
∂qi
(17)
and — similarly — when we differentiate with respect to qj
−ω∂a
∗
i
∂qj
+
∂λ
∂qj
= 0
∂a∗i
∂qj
=
1
ω
∂λ
∂qj
(18)
Next we combine KKT-condition (14b) with the observations above. First recognize that the
equation
∑
j a
∗
j = 1 is equivalent to
∑
j|a∗j>0 a
∗
j = 1. These equations imply∑
j
∂a∗j
∂qi
= 0, (19a)
∑
j|a∗j>0
∂a∗j
∂qi
= 0. (19b)
By combining (17), (18) and (19b), it follows that
−Di
ω
+
n∗
ω
∂λ
∂qi
= 0,
where n∗ is the number of agents with strict positive probability of being attacked. By
solving this expression for ∂λ/∂qi and substituting the result in (17) and (18), we establish
the statement.
Proposition 4 bears further consequences for vertex-transitive networks, where each agent
obtains the same number of documents in expectation, Di = D. For this reason, more precise
results can be obtained, including the following monotonicity property: if an agent invests
more in security than another agent, then his attack probability is lower (and vice versa).
Proposition 5 (Attacks to vertex-transitive networks). If the network is vertex-transitive
then a∗i < a
∗
j if and only if qi > qj.
Proof. Firstly, we rewrite (15a) to obtain
λ∗ =
ω
n∗
− D
n∗
∑
`:a∗`>0
(1− q`)
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Next if a∗i > 0 then
a∗i =
1
ω
((1− qi)D + λ)
=
1
n∗
− D
ω
(
qi − 1
n∗
∑
`:a∗`>0
q`
)
It is then clear that, provided a∗i > 0, a
∗
i < a
∗
j if and only if qi > qj . If instead a
∗
i = 0, then
we derive the following equivalent inequalities.
(1− qi)D + λ∗ ≤ 0
λ∗ ≤ −(1− qi)D
ω
n∗
− D
n∗
∑
`:a∗`>0
(1− q`) ≤ −(1− qi)D
qi ≥ ω
Dn∗
+
1
n∗
∑
`:a∗`>0
q`.
At the same time, a∗j > 0 is equivalent to
0 <
1
n∗
− D
ω
(
qj − 1
n∗
∑
`:a∗`>0
q`
)
⇔ qj < ω
Dn∗
+
1
n∗
∑
`:a∗`>0
q`.
Thus, 0 = a∗i < a
∗
j is equivalent to qi > qj .
This result immediately leads to the following implications: (a) maximal investments in
security guarantee an upper bound on the attack probability; and (b) if all agents invest the
same amount, then the attack vector is uniform.
Corollary 1. For vertex-transitive networks, there hold true that:
(a) if qi = 1 for some i, then a
∗
i ≤ 1/n;
(b) if qi = q¯ for all i, then a
∗
i = 1/n for all i.
5.2 Investments under strategic attacks
In stage 1 of the security game, the security investments are conveniently modeled as the
outcome of a game between the agents. In this game, they take the best response a∗(q) of
the adversary into account. The reward of agent i equals (cf. (8))
Πi = 1−
∑
j
a∗j (1− qj)Pij −
1
2
αq2i .
First we analyse the cooperative case, where the social utility
S =
∑
i
Πi = n−
∑
j
a∗j (1− qj)Dj −
1
2
∑
i
αq2i
is maximized. The proof of the following result is postponed to the Appendix.
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Theorem 3 (Social optimum against strategic attacks). In a vertex-transitive network facing
a strategic attack, the social optimum qO,S is unique and equal to
qO,Si =
D
αn
∀i ∈ V. (20)
Remark 1 (Uniform investments, uniform attacks and sacrificial lambs). Theorem 3 indi-
cates that it is socially optimal for an agent to invest the same as the others. As a conse-
quence, one may immediately verify that a∗(qO,S) = 1n , that is, the socially optimal uniform
investments imply uniform attack probability. In other words, we may say that the socially
optimal investments make the strategic advantage of the adversary void.
This recommendation is in contrast with some previous studies, for instance [6] [16], sug-
gesting that it might be optimal to leave some agents unprotected and make them sacrificing
lambs. Our setting differs from theirs mainly in the definition of the cost function, which is
quadratic in our case (as opposed to linear). We want to stress that the ineffectiveness of
sacrificing lambs is not an artefact of our homogeneity assumption. Certainly, the homogene-
ity of the investments as predicted by Theorem 3 is indeed a consequence of the homogeneity
of the networks. However, the indication that optimal investments make the attack proba-
bilities uniform appear to be valid beyond this scenario. Indeed, detailed calculations on the
star graphs (reported in the Appendix) show that also in that non-homogeneous network an
investments strategy that makes the attack probability uniform outperforms a sacrificial lamb
strategy.
Instead, if each agent optimizes his individual reward, the following equilibrium invest-
ment levels are attained.
Theorem 4 (Equilibrium against strategic attacks). In a vertex-transitive network facing a
strategic attack, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium vector of investment levels qN,S,
which is symmetric and given by
qN,Si =
(n−D)D + ω
(n−D)D + αnω ∀i ∈ V. (21)
Theorem 4, whose proof is also postponed to the Appendix, shows that the first stage of
the security game results in a unique and symmetric vector of investment levels. Combining
this equilibrium with the outcome of the second stage, results in the Stackelberg equilibrium
of our game.
Corollary 2 (Stackelberg equilibrium). The security game under strategic attack has a
unique Stackelberg equilibrium with investment levels qN,S and attack vector a∗(qN,S) given
by (15a), (15b) and (21).
The equilibrium investments in stage 1 are a function of D, the expected number of
documents obtained, which in turn depends on the transmission probability p.
Remark 2 (Dependence on p). The equilibrium investments (21) are increasing in p for
small p, till the point where D = n/2, after which they are decreasing in p. Indeed,
d
dp
(
(n−D)D) = (n− 2D)dD
dp
and thus
dqN,Si
dp
=
(n− 2D)dDdp (αn− 1)ω(
(n−D)D + αnω)2 (22)
In view of Proposition 1, the only root of (22) is given by pˆ such that D = n/2. Further,
dqN,Si /dp > 0 when D < n/2 and dq
N,S
i /dp < 0 when D > n/2.
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Example 8 (Ring, cont’d). For ring networks we derive from Example 2 that, after neglecting
exponential terms, pˆ ' 1− 4n+2 : hence, as n diverges, pˆ converges to 1. Moreover,
lim
n→∞ q
N,S
i =
1+p
1−p
1+p
1−p + αω
.
This value is strictly larger than the limit social optimum limn→∞ q
O,S
i = 0 as seen in Ex-
ample 4. We conclude that in large rings (which are sparse networks) strategic attacks lead
to over-investments, qN,Si > q
O,S
i .
Example 9 (Complete, cont’d). For complete networks we derive from Example 3 that, after
neglecting exponential terms, D ' n as n diverges. This implies that
qN,Si '
1
αn
.
Comparing this value with the limit social optimum limn→∞ q
O,S
i =
1
α , we conclude that in
large complete graphs strategic attacks lead to under-investments.
6 Discussion
The investment levels derived in the previous sections can easily be compared. A summary
of the most relevant comparisons is given in the following statement.
Theorem 5 (Investments in vertex-transitive networks). Assume the graph G to be vertex-
transitive.
1. Socially optimal investments do not depend on the type of attack, that is, qO,Ri = q
O,S
i .
2. Equilibrium investments are smaller in case of random attacks than in case of strategic
attacks, that is, qN,Ri ≤ qN,Si and the inequality is strict unless p = 1.
3. Random attacks lead to under-investments at equilibrium, that is, qN,Ri ≤ qO,Ri and the
inequality is strict unless p = 0.
4. Strategic attacks can lead to either under- or over-investments. The level of investment
depends on the probability p: for smaller p, over-investments occur, qN,Si > q
O,S
i and
for larger p, it leads to under-investments occur, qN,Si < q
O,S
i . Moreover, the condition
2(n−D)D ≥ (n− 2D)(αn− 1) (23)
is sufficient to guarantee a unique transmission probability p∗ at which the equilibrium
investments are socially optimal, qN,Si = q
O,S
i .
Proof. The first three items may be verified immediately by inspection. For the fourth
item, denote the investments by qi(p) to stress the dependence on p. Observe that that
qN,Si (1) = q
O,S
i (0) =
1
αn , q
O,S
i (1) =
1
α and q
N,S
i (0) >
1
αn . This implies that the graphs of
qN,Si (p) and q
O,S
i (p) intersect at least once.
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Applying the chain rule of differentiation and the fact that D increases with p lead to the
following inequalities:
∂
∂p
qO,Si >
∂
∂p
qN,Si
∂
∂D
D
αn
>
∂
∂D
(
1− (αn− 1)ω
(n−D)D + αωn
)
1
αn
>
(αn− 1)ω(n− 2D)(
(n−D)D + αωn)2
(n−D)D + (αωn)2+αωn (2(n−D)D − (n− 2D)(αn− 1)) > 0.
A sufficient condition for the latter inequality to be true is given by (23).
A few comments about this statement are in order. Regarding social optima, the reader
may find surprising that optimal investments against random and strategic attacks coincide.
Indeed, the optimal investments against strategic attacks trivialize the strategy of the at-
tacker, that is, make the attack probabilities uniform. This observation is confirmed by the
star graph example, described in the Appendix, where the investments that make the attack
uniform yield higher reward than sacrificing lamb investments. In the special case of vertex-
transitive networks, the uniformity in the attack probability is reflected in the uniformity of
the investments.
Regarding equilibria, we observe that equilibrium investments against strategic attacks
are always higher than against random attacks, which feature under-investment in compari-
son with the social optimum. In other words, players that are aware of the strategic nature
of the attack shall invest more than against a random attack. This difference is consistent
with intuition, since players facing a strategic attacker can be expected to invest more to
divert attacks away from themselves. However, the theorem also shows that the awareness of
strategic attacks is not sufficient to prevent under-investments (even though strategic invest-
ments remain larger than investments in the random setting). Actually, under-investments
against strategic attacks appear precisely when the risk is higher, that is, in the presence of a
larger transmission probability and a more tightly connected networks. Indeed, the turning
point p∗ from over- to under-investments is lower in denser networks.
These general facts can be numerically verified in our running examples. We report in
Figures 4, 5 and 6 the optimal and equilibrium investments as functions of the diffusion
probability p, computed for complete, ring, and star topologies with n = 5 nodes. Several
observations can be made about the similarities and differences between these three very
different networks (we remind that the star graph is not vertex-transitive, therefore not
covered by Theorem 5).
1. On all these networks, strategic attacks make the agents invest more at equilibrium
than random attacks.
2. On all these networks, the optimal strategic investments are increasing and become
equal to 1/α when p = 1 and equal to 1αn when p = 0: at that point they coincide with
the equilibrium investments against random attack. Instead, equilibrium investments
become equal to 1αn when p = 1. The extreme values for p = 0, 1 do not depend on the
topology.
3. On all these networks, the equilibrium results in over-investments for small transmission
probabilities p and in under-investments for large transmission probabilities.
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4. For each node, there is a unique probability p∗i where over-investments pass on to
under-investments and equilibrium investments are socially optimal.
5. The transition from over-investments to under-investments takes place at smaller tran-
sition probabilities where connectivity is stronger. Consistently, the probability with
the largest equilibrium investment level is smaller where connectivity is stronger.
These observations are consistent with our theoretical results, even if some of them were
proved for vertex-transitive networks only, thereby showing that their insights are valid on
general networks.
Figure 4: Security investments in a complete graph with n = 5 nodes where α = ω = 1.
Figure 5: Security investments in a ring graph with n = 5 nodes where α = ω = 1.
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Figure 6: Security investments in a star graph with n = 5 nodes where α = ω = 1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied in detail a model of strategic defensive allocation to elucidate the
economic forces at play. We have shown how the type of attack by the adversary influences
the investments by the agents. Equilibrium investments are larger under strategic attacks
than under random attacks. Furthermore, in case of random attacks the equilibrium invest-
ments are always lower than socially optimal, which represents under-investments in security.
Finally, in case of strategic attacks, there are over-investments for small transmission prob-
abilities p and under-investments for large probabilities. This transition takes place at lower
probabilities p in more dense networks. Indeed, those networks where the stakes are higher,
because the number of shared documents is larger, are precisely those that are prone to
under-investments.
In a large part of this work, the assumption of vertex-transitivity postulates a homogeneity
in the network, which greatly simplifies the analysis. Another simplifying assumption is the
choice of quadratic costs. Even though extending the scope of our analysis would certainly
be of interest, we believe that our contribution already exemplifies the fundamental issues of
these network privacy games and the key role of the network topology therein.
The importance of the network topology is reflected by the fact that optimal investments
in random and strategic attacks and equilibrium investments in strategic attacks depend
explicitly on the expected number of received documents and, therefore, on the topology.
Therefore, the players need to know about the topology to implement their strategies. Since
such a knowledge may be hard to obtain in practice, a relevant open question is defining a
version of this security game that takes into account suitable limitations of such knowledge.
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A Information dissemination on the complete graph
We begin by proving1 formula (6).
Proposition 6. Let Qn be the probability that any document reaches all nodes in Kn. Then,
for any p, it holds that Q1 = 1 and
Qn = 1−
n−1∑
`=1
(
n− 1
`− 1
)
(1− p)`(n−`)Q` ∀n > 1.
Proof. Let T ni be a transmission network in Kn and observe that Qn is equal to the proba-
bility that T ni is connected. Let Cn(i) be the component in which i lies in the transmission
network T ni and compute
Pr{T ni is connected } = Pr{|Cn(i)| = n}
= 1−
n−1∑
`=1
Pr{|Cn(i)| = `},
where |Cn(i)| is the number of nodes in Cn(i). To evaluate Pr{|Cn(i)| = `}, let V` be the
set of the subsets of V that include node i and have cardinality `: recognize that there are(
n−1
`−1
)
such subsets. Next, by conditioning on all V˜ ∈ V` and exploiting the assumptions of
1The result in Proposition 6 is probably well known. For instance it can be found stated in slide 4
of http://keithbriggs.info/documents/connectivity-Manchester2004Nov19.pdf. Here we provide a proof
for completeness.
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independence between the edges, we can compute
Pr{|Cn(i)| = `} =
∑
V˜ ∈V`
Pr{Cn(i) = V˜ }
=
∑
V˜ ∈V`
Pr{ V˜ is connected in T ni }Pr{ no edge between V˜ and V \ V˜ }
=
∑
V˜ ∈V`
Pr{|C`(i)| = `}(1− p)`(n−`)
=
(
n− 1
`− 1
)
(1− p)`(n−`) Pr{|C`(i) = `|}, (24)
so concluding the proof.
Next, we prove Equation (7).
Proposition 7. In a complete network on n nodes, for every p and all i 6= j
Pnij =
n∑
k=2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
(1− p)k(n−k)Qk.
Proof. By conditioning on the size of the component in which j lies
Pnij = Pr{j is connected to j in Ti}
=
n∑
k=1
Pr{j is connected to j in Ti| |Cn(j)| = k}Pr{|Cn(j)| = k}
=
n∑
k=1
k − 1
n− 1 Pr{|Cn(j)| = k},
where we have used the fact that all nodes are equally likely to be in Cn(j). The result
follows by using (24).
B Sacrificial vs uniform strategies on the star graph
Let us first consider the strategy that ensures uniform attack probabilities. From the deriva-
tions in Example 7, we observe that when ∆ = 0, necessarily a∗i =
1
n and q1 = 1− (1−q2)D2D1 .
Therefore,
S =n−
∑
j
a∗j (1− qj)Dj −
α
2
∑
j
q2j
=n− (1− q2)D2 − α
2
+ α(1− q2)D2
D1
− α
2
(1− q2)2D
2
2
D21
− α
2
(n− 1)q22
Its derivative is
∂S
∂q2
=D2 − αD2
D1
+ α
D22
D21
− q2
(
α
D22
D21
+ α(n− 1)),
showing that the reward is optimal for
q2 =
D2
α − D2D1 +
D22
D21
D22
D21
+ n− 1
.
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Since the expression for the resulting optimal reward is cumbersome, we prefer to present an
approximation for large n. In that limit, we find
S∗
n
=1− p2 + p
4
2α
+O
(
1
n
)
.
Moreover, notice that q∗2 =
p2
α +O
(
1
n
)
and q∗1 = 1−p+ p
3
α +O
(
1
n
)
, where the latter quantity
is larger than the former: the center has to invest more than the leaves to ensure uniform
attacks.
Let us then compare this reward with that of a sacrificial lamb. In this strategy we assume
that one of the leaves is left unprotected, qlamb = 0. In this case, equations (15) imply that
alamb = 1 as long as q1 and q2 are large enough: more precisely, as long as
q2 ≥ ω
D2
(25a)
q1 ≥ω +D1 −D2
D1
(25b)
Note that the first quantity goes to zero in the limit of large networks, whereas the second
one is approximated by 1−p: therefore, the lamb strategy is feasible. Under conditions (25),
we can calculate
Slamb =n−
∑
j
a∗j (1− qj)Dj −
α
2
∑
j
q2j
≤n−D2 − α
2
((
1− D2
D1
+
ω
D1
)2
+ (n− 2) ω
2
D22
)
=n (1− p2) + o(n).
This quantity is smaller that S∗, thereby showing that the uniform strategy gives higher
reward, at least for large enough networks.
C Proof of Theorem 3
The proof takes four steps. (i) We show that no component of qO,S is either 0 or 1. (ii) We
deduce the first order conditions (FOC) for optimality of the social optima. (iii) We show
that there is no asymmetric investment level which solves this FOC. (iv) We find a symmetric
social optimum and prove that this (symmetric) optimum is unique.
(i) Preliminary, we compute the gradient of S as
∂S
∂qi
= −
∑
j
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj)Dj + a∗iDi − αqi.
By the assumption of vertex-transitivity this reduces to
∂S
∂qi
= −D
∑
j
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj) + a∗iD − αqi. (26)
Next, we show that the gradient of S, ∇(S), does not point outward at the boundary of
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[0, 1]n. First,
∂S
∂qi
({qi = 0,q−i}) = −D∂a
∗
i
∂qi
−D
∑
j 6=i
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj) + a∗iD
≥ −D∂a
∗
i
∂qi
−D
∑
j 6=i
∂a∗j
∂qi
+ a∗iD
= −D
∑
j
∂a∗j
∂qi
+ a∗iD = a
∗
iD > 0,
where the final equality follows from (19a). Second,
∂S
∂qi
({qi = 1,q−i}) = −
∑
j 6=i
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj)D + a∗iD − α
≤ −
∑
j 6=i
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj)D < 0,
where the weak inequality follows from a∗iD−α ≤ 0 due to D ≤ n, a∗i ≤ 1/n due to Corollary
1.(a), and 1 ≤ α.
(ii) The social optimum qO,S thus belongs to (0, 1)n. From (26) and ∂S/∂qi = 0 the
social optimum solves for each agent i
αqi = a
∗
iD −D
∑
j
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj). (27)
(iii) In order to prove that all components of qO,S are equal, without loss of generality
let q1 = max q
O,S and q2 = min q
O,S and assume that q1 > q2. We derive a contradiction.
Observe that by (27)
αq1 = a
∗
1D −D
∂a∗1
∂q1
(1− q1)−D
∑
i 6=1
∂a∗i
∂q1
(1− qi)
= a∗1D +D
∑
i 6=1
∂a∗i
∂q1
(1− q1)−D
∑
i 6=1
∂a∗i
∂q1
(1− qi), (28)
where the last equality is due to (19a) for i = 1. Similarly
αq2 = a
∗
2D −D
∂a∗2
∂q2
(1− q2)−D
∑
i 6=2
∂a∗i
∂q2
(1− qi)
= a∗2D +D
∑
i 6=2
∂a∗i
∂q2
(1− q2)−D
∑
i 6=2
∂a∗i
∂q2
(1− qi), (29)
with the last equality due to (19a) for i = 2. Observe that a∗1 < a
∗
2, the definition of q1
implies 0 ≤ 1− q1 ≤ 1− qO,Si and that ∂a∗i /∂q1 ≥ 0 for all i 6= 1 by (16). Then
D
∑
i6=1
∂a∗i
∂q1
(1− q1)−D
∑
i6=1
∂a∗i
∂q1
(1− qi) = −D
∑
i 6=1
∂a∗i
∂q1
(q1 − qi) = αq1 − a∗1D < 0,
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with the final equality due to (27) and the inequality follows from q1− q` > 0 for at least one
`. By a similar line of arguments
D
∑
i 6=2
∂a∗i
∂q2
(1− q2)−D
∑
i 6=2
∂a∗i
∂q2
(1− qi) = αq2 − a∗2D > 0.
These two inequalities prove that the right-hand side of (29) is larger than the right-hand
side of (28), which contradicts q1 > q2. Therefore, q1 = q2 and all components of q
O,S are
equal.
(iv) Now we have established that qO,S is a symmetric social optimal investment level,
we elaborate (27) to derive αqO,Si = a
∗
iD−D(1− qO,Si )
∑
j
∂a∗j
∂qi
= a∗iD by (19). By summing
qO,Si = a
∗
iD/α over all i and using symmetry we obtain (20).
D Proof of Theorem 4
Notice that the agents play a strategic game amongst themselves in stage 1. We refer to the
outcome of that stage as an equilibrium. The proof is divided into three intermediate steps.
1. We prove that there exists at least one pure strategy equilibrium.
2. We prove that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
3. We exhibit a symmetric equilibrium.
Let us preliminary recall the reward of agent i,
Πi = 1−
∑
j
a∗j (1− qj)Pij −
1
2
αq2i , (30)
and that the equilibrium solves ∂Πi∂qi = 0. The derivative of (30) is given by
∂Πi
∂qi
= a∗i −
∑
j∈V
∂a∗j
∂qi
(1− qj)Pij − αqi (31)
Step 1. We prove that Πi is quasi-concave in qi. The derivative of (31) is given by
∂2Πi
∂q2i
= 2
∂a∗i
∂qi
−
∑
j∈V
∂2a∗j
∂q2i
(1− qj)Pij − α
= −2Dn
∗ − 1
ωn∗
− α < 0, (32)
where the second equality follows from (16) and
∂2a∗j
∂q2i
= 0. As the second derivative of the
utility of agent i is negative, we conclude that Πi is actually concave. We are now in the
position to apply the result by Debreu, Fan, Glicksberg [8, 9, 11] who showed that a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the strategic form game of stage 1 when the strategy sets
are compact and convex, and the utility of each agent is quasi-concave in the agent’s own
strategy and continuous in the strategy of other agents.
Step 2. We start by finding the second order derivatives of Πi. In (32) we already
computed this derivative to qi. Additionally note that the derivative of (31) to qj for j 6= i
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is given by
d2Πi
dqidqj
=
da∗i
dqj
+
da∗j
dqi
Pij −
∑
κ∈V
d2a∗κ
dqidqj
(1− qκ)Pi,κ
=
D
ωn∗
(1 + Pij),
where
d2a∗κ
dqidqj
= 0 is used in the second equality.
Secondly, we determine the number of agents having a positive probability of being at-
tacked, n∗. For any agent i
∂Πi
∂qi
({0, q−i}) = ai −
∑
j 6=i
∂aj
∂qi
[1− qj ]Pi,j − ∂ai
∂qi
> ai −
∑
j 6=i
∂aj
∂qi
− ∂ai
∂qi
= ai −
∑
j 6=i
∂aj
∂qi
= ai ≥ 0. (33)
This implies that qi > 0: that is, it is not optimal not to investment, since slightly increasing
the investment level will result in larger rewards. Now assume that a∗i = 0. By (30), the
rewards of agent i will be
Πi = 1−
∑
j 6=i
a∗j (1− qj)Pij −
1
2
αq2i .
Since the equilibrium investments qi maximize these rewards, we should have qi = 0. But
this contradicts our conclusion from (33). Therefore, our assumption a∗i = 0 was false and we
must have a∗i > 0 for all agents i. This implies n
∗ = n, all agents have a positive probability
of being attacked.
Combining these results, the negated Jacobian −J with Jij = ∂2Πi∂qi∂qj becomes
− J =

2n−2
ωn D + α − Dωn (1 + P12) · · · − Dωn (1 + P1n)
− Dωn (1 + P21) 2n−2ωn D + α · · · − Dωn (1 + P2n)
...
...
. . .
...
− Dωn (1 + Pn1) − Dωn (1 + Pn2) · · · 2n−2ωn D + α.

(34)
Next we show that the matrix −J is diagonally dominant.∑
j 6=i
| − Jij | =
∑
j 6=i
D
ωn
(1 + Pij)
=
D(n− 1)
ωn
+
D(D − 1)
ωn
≤ D(n− 1)
ωn
+
D(n− 1)
ωn
= D
2n− 2
ωn
≤ | − Jii|, for all i.
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Because the matrix −J is also symmetric, all principal minors in the negated Jacobian are
positive [5]. Because of this, the Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game is unique [10]. As
we already concluded that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists, we are able to conclude
that this equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
Step 3. Finally, we exhibit the symmetric equilibrium q = q1. Because of this symmetry,
a∗i = 1/n by Corollary 1. Starting from (31) we obtain
∂Πi
∂qi
=
1
n
− (1− q)
∑
j∈V
∂a∗j
∂qi
Pij − αq
=
1
n
+ (1− q)n− 1
ωn
D − (1− q) D
ωn
(D − 1)− αq
=
1
n
+ (1− q) D
ωn
(n−D)− αq.
Since the equilibrium solves ∂Πi/∂qi = 0, the expression (21) follows immediately.
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